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Although China has made impressive progress in economic development and improving social well-being, 
it is facing many daunting challenges while transforming toward a knowledge and service-based economy 
and further opening up to international competition after its WTO accession in the context of knowledge 
revolution. One of the biggest challenges is how to create 100–300 million new jobs in the coming decade 
to absorb the millions of laid-offs, rural emigrants and newly added labor force. China has been successful 
in building high-tech parks and ICT industries, but they are limited in terms of employment generation, 
while most of the traditional labor-intensive industries are losing competitiveness due to low productivity. 
In order to combat the unprecedented employment challenge, China must implement a systemic and 
sustained strategy, which may consist of the following policy thrusts: encouraging the private sector; 
promoting small and medium enterprises; expanding the service sector; reforming the state-owned 
enterprises; strengthening the social security system; improving labor market flexibility; and establishing 
mass retraining programs.    
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I. Introduction 
 
China has achieved great success since it undertook reform in 1978. It was one of the 
world’s fastest growing economies in the 1980s and 1990s. According to official 
statistics, the annual growth rate of real GDP over the past two decades has averaged 
9.2%. Its gross national income ranked number six in the world in nominal terms and 
number two in purchasing power parity (PPP) term in 2001. The per capita GDP 
quadrupled. The real per capita GDP (PPP adjusted) increased from $430 international 
dollars in 1980 to $4,475 international dollars in 2002. 
1 China’s total value of imports 
and exports rose from $20.6 billion in 1978 to $620.8 billion in 2002, which makes it the 
6
th largest trading nation in the world. As a result of rapid economic growth, people’s 
standards of living have also been greatly increased. With about one-quarter of a 
century’s reform, China has lifted about 400 million people out of poverty at the $1 a day 
expenditure level. 
2  This is one of the greatest accomplishments in human history. 
 
Along with these developments, the Chinese economy has become increasingly open. 
The ratio of trade to GDP more than tripled over the past two decades, from 13% in 1978 
to 44% in 2000. The percentage increase was the greatest among the major emerging 
market economies during this period. China has also been one of the largest recipients of 
foreign direct investment (FDI), which grew from almost zero to 4-5% of GDP each year 
in the second half of the 1990s. By May 2000, about 349,537 companies were set up in 
China by foreign investors from over 180 countries. Total accumulative FDI inflows rose 
rapidly from $1.8 billion in 1983 to $446.3 billion in 2002. 
3  All these achievements so 
far have been unmatchable in the rest of the world.  
 
II. Daunting Challenges Ahead 
 
At the same time, China is undertaking a transformation toward knowledge and service-
based economy and undergoing wrenching structural changes. In the context of 
knowledge revolution, as China is further opening up to international competition after its 
WTO accession, it faces enhanced pressures to keep up with new knowledge and 
restructuring economic activities to take advantage of new and better ways of producing 
goods and services.  
 
Internally, it faces many daunting challenges ahead. By 2002, China’s labor force 
accounts for 25.4% of the world’s total, apparently higher (due to age structure) than the 
proportion of its population in the world’s total (20.7%). 
4  The biggest challenge is: how 
to productively employ its labor force of over 744 million as it shifts from an agricultural 
to an industrial and soon a service-based economy, especially how to absorb or reemploy 
the millions of laid-offs and rural emigrants. It is estimated that China will have to create 
around 100–300 million new jobs in the coming decade.  So it must maintain a high rate 
of GDP growth, implement an effective employment strategy, and deal with income and 
                                                 
1 World Bank SIMA database, 2003.  
2 The World Bank, China: Promoting Growth with Equity, Country Economic Memorandum, Washington, 
DC, September 2003.  
3 National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical Abstract 2003, China Statistics Press, Beijing. 
4 Author’s calculation based on data from the World Bank SIMA database 2003.    4
regional inequality—as well as serious resource and environmental constraints. The 
SARS crisis in 2003 also revealed a threat of unbalanced social development.  
 
II.1 The Current Employment Situation 
 
China’s economic growth has not been labor intensive. According to an estimate of the 
World Bank, in the 1980s, when China’s economic growth was 9.3% a year, employment 
growth was just 3% a year, and in the 1990s, when economic growth was about 10.4%, 
employment growth was only 1.1%. By official statistics, in 2002, there were about 7.7 
million unemployed people in the urban areas. 
5  However, the widely perceived effective 
unemployment rate is about 10% or even higher, far above the officially registered 
unemployment level, and, during the late 1990s, each year around 12 million people 
leave unprofitable formal sector activities (mainly state-owned and collectives).
6  Xue 
and Zhong estimated that the urban unemployment rate reached 11.5% in 2000 and had 
become a major cause of urban poverty and worsening inequality 
7 (table 1).  
 















1990 4.2    2.5  2.9  4.2 
1991     2.3  3.2  4.7 
1992     2.3  3.9  5.5 
1993     2.6  3.2  7.1 
1994     2.8  3.6  8.6 
1995 7.7  9.6  2.9  4.3  7.7 
1996     3.0  4.8  7.3 
1997     3.1  5.5  9.2 
1998     3.1  4.5  10.8 
1999   11.6  3.1  6.3  12.5 
2000 11.5    3.1  8.1  11.5 
Source: Population Census in China, 1990, 2000; China Statistic Yearbook, various years, and surveys   
in 1995 (6,868 households and 21,533 individuals in 11 provinces and 60 cities) and 1999 (4,500 
households and 15,904 individuals in 6 provinces and 13 cities) by the Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences. Also see Xue & Zhong, “Unemployment, Poverty and Income Disparity in Urban China”, 
Asian Economic Journal, V17, No. 4, 2003.   
Notes: 
a  Laid-off unemployed = laid-off workers – reemployed. In official statistics, the laid-off 
workers are not counted as unemployed, regardless of their individual situations.  
                                                 
5 National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical Abstract 2003, China Statistics Press, Beijing. 
6 The formal sector refers to state-owned and collectively owned enterprises, plus joint stock and 
shareholding companies and foreign funded enterprises but excluding township and village enterprises. In a 
broad definition, they also include non-enterprise units, such as government agencies, institutes, non-profit 
organizations, etc. 
7 Three surveys conducted by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) in 1988, 1995, and 1999, 
respectively, show that the Gini coefficient for the urban area rose from 0.185 in 1988 to 0.225 in 1995 and 
0.256 in 1999. The percentage increase was 22% for the period 1988-1995, 14% for the period 1995-1999 
and 38% for the whole period 1988-1999. The 1999 survey also shows that the poverty rate was 13.2% for 
households with unemployed people and only 2.8% for households without unemployed people. See Xue & 
Zhong (2003).   5
b Estimation by using the census data as benchmarks and link them with the adjusted unemployment    
data. See Xue & Zhong (2003) for details.  
 
Between 1996 and 2001, the number of urban and township workers fell from 149 
million to 108 million, a net reduction of  41 million or 28%.
8  This includes a main drop 
of 52.5 million in state-owned and urban collectives and an increase of 12 million in the 
emerging formal private sector (joint stock and shareholding companies and foreign-
funded enterprises). Meanwhile, at the same time period, the employment in the urban 
informal private and self-employed sectors enjoyed a 13.3 million, or 57% increase. The 
number of rural emigrants is also rapidly increasing. Current estimates of the number of 
migrant workers fluctuate between 40 and 80 million, which is about 6-10 percent of the 
total labor force.
9  According to the survey data from the National Statistics Bureau, from 
1997-2000, the share of rural migrant labor as a percentage of the total rural labor force 
increased from 18.1% to 23.6%, i.e., from 83.2 million to 113.4 million,  increasing 10.07 
million or 10.8% annually on average. 
 
With the “revitalizing China with science and education” policy, China has achieved 
great success in several new industries in the past five to seven years, particularly high 
technology and ICTs. China has also been successful in modernizing and restructuring 
the economic base of coastal cities through the “special economic zone” approach. 
However, these new industries are limited in terms of employment-generating capability. 
In the late 1990s employment in the 53 designated high-technology parks (mostly in the 
coastal areas) had reached only 2.2 million people, even though several parks have 
enjoyed rapid and sustained growth (annual growth in sales of 50%). 
10 
 
Electronics and telecommunications industries, despite considerable efforts toward their 
development, do not generate many new jobs. 
11 Altogether these industries’ share 
reached 8.7% of the manufacturing total labor force in 2000, up from 7.3% in 1994 (table 
2). On the other hand, the labor-intensive light industries employed more than 30% of the 
labor force in 2000. Growing steadily, the traditional basic industries—such as metal 
products, chemicals, and machinery, which have not received priority attention from the 








Table 2.  Number and Share of Workers in Manufacturing Industries (1994-2000) 
a  
    1994 1996 1998  2000 
                                                 
8 Calculated based on data from China Statistical Yearbook 1999, and China Labor Statistical Yearbook 
2002, China Statistics Press, Beijing. 
9 The lower estimate reflects published data of Ministry of Public Security, the higher estimate is by the 
World Bank based on the 2000 census. 
10 Dahlman, C. and J. Aubert, China & Knowledge Economy: Seizing the 21
st Century, 2001, the World 
Bank, Washington, DC. 






















Manufacturing  industry  54,320  100  52,930 100  37,690 100  32,400 100 
Light  industry  18,060  33.25 17,280  32.65  11,650  30.91 9,950 30.71 
Chemical  products  7,960  14.65 8,140 15.38  6,220 16.5  5,350 16.51 
Metal  products  10,440  19.22 10,260  19.38  7,430 19.71 6,380 19.69 
Machinery  10,810  19.9  10,560  19.95  7,510 19.93 6,290 19.41 
Electronics and 
telecommunications  3,960  7.29  3,990 7.54  3,040 8.07  2,830 8.73 
Miscellaneous  3,610  6.65  2,110 3.99  1,390 3.69  1,220 3.77 
a. Includes only state-owned industrial enterprises and non-state enterprises with annual sales greater than 5 
million yuan).  
Note: Industries were grouped according to six categories: light industry, chemical products, metal 
products, machinery and transport equipment, electronic and telecommunications equipment, and 
miscellaneous.  
Source: National Bureau of Statistics: China Statistical Yearbook 2002.  
 
Overall, China’s current labor market manifests the following characteristics. First, while 
the state sector is shedding employment in large numbers, the non-state sector, especially 
the private sector, is enjoying a rapid increase in employment. This is the so-called “dual 
labor market structure”, where two sectors are competing for skilled workers. 
12  Second, 
employment has been shifting from primary and secondary sectors to the tertiary sector. 
One notable trend is that an increasing number of rural laborers are migrating to urban 
areas to work mostly in service activities, such as cleaning, maintenance and repair, 
construction, restaurants, and so on. Third, a large portion of laid-off workers become 
permanently unemployed. It is increasingly difficult for these workers to be re-employed 
in conditions of labor over-supply. According to an official statistical bulletin, in the first 
half of 2001, out of 7.69 million laid-off workers, only 0.79 million succeeded in 
obtaining other jobs, and the re-employment rate was only 10%. 
13  Fourth, with 
economic development and urbanization, there is an increasing number of people 
displaced by extensive land requisition in peri-urban areas. Those displaced include 
farmers, shopkeepers, enterprise employees, and migrants. For example, in Shanghai, for 
every hectare of farmland requisitioned, between 15-30 people have to be given new non-
agricultural employment. 
14  The resettlement of these people poses another big challenge 
to the government and the labor market.      
 
II.2 The Employment Impact of the WTO Accession 
 
Estimates of the employment impact vary widely, depending on the assumptions one 
makes about the employment elasticity of output, the extent to which imported goods will 
                                                 
12 Cai, Fang, “The Transformation of the Employment Structure in a Dual Labor Market”, Social Sciences 
in China, Vol. 20, No. 3, Autumn 1999.  
13 Bhalla, A. S. and S. Qiu, “China’s Accession to WTO: Its Impact on Chinese Employment”, UNCTD 
discussion paper, No. 163, November 2002. 
14 Meikle, Sheilah and Y. Zhu, “Employment for Displacees in the Socialist Market Economy of China”, 
from Cernea, Michael M. and C. McDowell ed., Risks and Reconstruction: Experiences of Resettlers and 
Refugees, the World Bank, Washington, D.C., 2000.   7
replace domestic goods and the magnitude of bankruptcies of inefficient state and non-
state firms. Estimates of the employment elasticity by sector and time period show that it 
has declined in primary and secondary sectors (table 3), but is generally higher in the 
tertiary sector, which is likely to absorb the bulk of displaced labor as a result of the 
accession.  
 
Table 3.  Employment Elasticity of Output (in periods) 





































  Note: Elasticity in each period is an average of annual figures.  
Source: Calculated based on the data from the China Statistical Yearbook, and China  
             Labor Statistical Yearbook, various years.  Bhalla, A. S., and S. Qiu, 2002. 
    
Generally speaking, a negative impact of the accession on employment will be felt 
through import competition and the resulting closure of inefficient domestic firms, 
especially SOEs and collectives. However, this impact will not be evenly spread across 
sectors and industries. Most researchers believe that the potential for employment growth 
is minimal or negative in such sectors as agriculture, automobiles, machinery and 
instruments. Some estimate that employment in the agricultural sector will be reduced by 
9.66 million (or 3.6 percent of the current total), automobiles 4.98 million (14.5 percent 
of  the total), and machinery and instrument 5.82 million (2.5 per cent of the total) in 
seven years after the accession. 
15  Ianchovichina and Martin assessed the changes in 
output and employment in selected Chinese industries due to WTO accession for the 
period after 2001. They estimate that an employment gain might occur in the following 
industries: plant based fibers, livestock and meat, clothing, light manufacturing and 
electronics. On the other hand, employment will decline in foodgrains, feedgrains, 
vegetables and fruits, oilseeds, beverages and tobacco, petrochemicals, metals, 
automobiles, communication, and commercial services, etc. Furthermore, for the period 
of 2001-2007, approximately 6 million farm workers will leave their farm jobs as a result 
of WTO accession reform after 2001 to pursue employment in non-agricultural sectors. 
16  
Bhalla and Qiu also think that China has no comparative advantage in foodgrains, 
feedgrains, and oilseeds because they are land-intensive crops and China’s domestic 
prices for these commodities are much higher than world prices. But they think in other 
primary export products including meat, fishery products, vegetables, fruits and tobacco, 
China will still maintain a comparative advantage as these products do not need much 
land and can utilize redundant labor. 
17  They also presented a general picture of WTO 
impact on the Chinese industry by a matrix of industry ownership, openness, technology 
                                                 
15 Beijing Evening News, 18 November 1999.  
16 Ianchovichina, Elena, W. Martin, Economic Impacts of China’s Accession to the World Trade 
Organization, World Bank Working Paper, the World Bank, May 2003.   
17 Bhalla, A. S. and S. Qiu, “China’s Accession to WTO: Its Impact on Chinese Employment”, UNCTD 
discussion paper, No. 163, November 2002.   8
level and entry barriers (table 4). Yao (2002) believes that the WTO accession will likely 




   Table 4.  Matrix of the Impact of WTO Accession on Chinese Industry 
Market structure  Ownership 
structure 








Competition in both 











Low or zero  Low or zero  (a) Economic:  
•  Higher efficiency; 
•  Better market access. 
(b) Social: 
•  Increase in employment 
through increase in 
exports. 
Segmented/protected: 
Domestic and export 
markets are segmented 












Medium or high  Low or 
medium 
(a) Economic: 
•  Improved efficiency; 
•  Better market access. 
(b) Social: 
Loss of employment in 
inefficient enterprises; 




mostly closed to 
foreign entry (e.g., 
telecom, banking & 




High Medium  or 
high 
(a) Economic: 
•  Scope for raising 
efficiency;  
•  Better market access. 
(b) Social: loss in 
employment due to import 
competition; increase in 
employment through better 
market access. 
Source: Bhalla, A. S., and S. Qiu, 2002. 
 
Despite the different effects on specific industries, the overall employment situation after 
the WTO accession will be very challenging. According to the author’s estimation, 
China’s labor force will grow by 80 million people over the next decade—from 742 
million in 2000 to 822 million in 2010. A World Bank study (which the author 
participated in) shows that, considering the new entrants, the continuing employment 
shake-offs from agriculture, state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and township and village 
enterprises (TVEs), as well as the displaced and early retirees, it is expected that the 
Chinese economy needs to create about 8 to 9 million new employment opportunities 
annually. 
19  This is much higher than China’s current job-creation capacity. Furthermore, 
other projections estimate the number of new jobs to be created at a much higher level – 
                                                 
18 Yao, Shujie, “China’s Rural Economy in the First Decade of the 21st Century: Problems and Growth 
Constraints”, China Economic Review, V13, 2002, pp. 354-360.  
 
19 Dahlman, C. and J. Aubert, China & Knowledge Economy: Seizing the 21
st Century, 2001, the World 
Bank, Washington, DC.   9
20 to 30 million per year for the next decade, counting the potential lay-offs of half of the 
people currently working in agriculture, SOEs, and TVEs. 
20    
 
Though different in estimates, these projections show that a considerable number of new 
jobs will have to be created – taking a medium estimation, about 100 million (mostly in 
urban areas) in the next ten years. The high technology and advanced manufacturing 
sectors will not be able to add more than 20–30 million new jobs. Therefore, the main 
sources of new job creation will continue to be labor-intensive industries, such as textiles 
(where China is projected to increase its global market share from 20 to 40% by 2010) 
and the service industries (including tourism, building and construction, etc.).  
 
To dramatically increase employment in the service sector would be no easy job. Most of 
these new jobs will be in informal service sectors and basic infrastructure services 
(construction, transport, telecommunications), tourism, retailing, and commerce. Another 
important source for generating employment would be small private high-value business 
services (such as marketing, branding, consulting, management, financial, logistics, 
distribution) and other professional services. These are more intangible and knowledge-
intensive sectors and traditionally underdeveloped in China, but they are the critical 
components for a knowledge-based economy. 
21  If China wants to upgrade its industrial 
structure and greatly enhance its international competitiveness, these areas have to be 
well developed.  
 
In sum, although the WTO accession will certainly help generate some additional 
employment by attracting more foreign direct investment (FDI), boosting certain 
industries, and expanding related services, considering the poor productivity in most 
industries and sectors in China (see the following analysis) and the fierce international 
competition after further opening up, the negative employment impact of the accession 
would be far greater than its positive effect, especially in the short run.   
   
II.3 Weak Productivities – An International Comparison 
 
In China, the majority of the labor force is still in agriculture, traditional low and medium 
technology industries, and low skill services. These sectors are normally not performing 
very well, which can be seen from their poor productivity rates and a surprising decline in 
the share of services in overall GDP, despite rising prices.
22  One of the reasons is the lack 
of new technologies and management efficiency. Thus, it is crucial to disseminate new 
technologies and advanced management practices throughout the economy.   
 
Figure 1  Agriculture Productivity versus GDP/Capita, for the Period 1979–81          
                                                 
20 See 1999 Chinese Academy of Social Science report by Feng Nanrui. Note also that the tenth 5 Year 
Plan estimates that 40 million rural laborers will have to find jobs outside of the agriculture sector. 
21 Dahlman, C. and J. Aubert, China & Knowledge Economy: Seizing the 21
st Century, 2001, the World 
Bank, Washington, DC. 
22 See Hwa (2000) for data and an analysis of the underdevelopment of the service sector in China.   10
             Compared to 1999–2001 (Value Added per Worker in 1995 US$) 
Note: Data should be interpreted cautiously because international productivity comparisons are fraught 
with problems, including inconsistent data sources and definitions and biases caused by currency 
devaluations or appreciations. 
Source: Author’s analysis based on data from the World Bank Development Indicators 2003.   
 
A comparison of China’s labor productivity with advanced economies and other 
developing economies shows that China is lagging behind and needs to make great 
progress in all sectors (figure 1). 
23 According to the World Bank figures, Agricultural 
productivity per worker in China is 75% of that in India and only 0.8% of that in France 
or the United States. The IMD (International Institute for Management Development) 
data also show the sharp contrasts between China and developed countries and even with 
some developing countries (table 5). Only the cereal yields per hectare in China are not 
far from U.S. yields and are much higher than those in Brazil, Malaysia, and India (table 
6). This suggests that to some extent the productivity problem in the Chinese agricultural 
sector is one of surplus labor and land tenancy—too many people (many of them are 
redundant) working on the segmented pieces of lands under the household responsibility 
system, making it unsuitable for large machine-based production—rather than technical 
incompetence (table 7). According to Rozelle et al., the average size of a farm is only 
about 1.2 acres, and each farm typically has multiple plots.
24  The arable land per capita 
has experienced a huge decrease. Based on J. Knight & L. Song’s study, over the 
commune and planning period (1952-78), the area under cultivation rose by only 3%, and 
cultivated land per rural worker fell by more than one-half. Over the period of economic 
                                                 
23 Dahlman, C. and J. Aubert, China & Knowledge Economy: Seizing the 21
st Century, 2001, the World 
Bank, Washington, DC. 
24 Rozelle, Scott, Jikun Huang and L. Zhang, “Emerging Markets, Evolving Institutions, and the New 
Opportunities for Growth in China’s Rural Economy”, China Economic Review, V13, 2002, pp. 345-353.    11
reform (1978-2000) this trend continued, and the fall exceeded one-third. 
25 Yao also 
estimated that, between 1953 and 1989, per capita arable land and crop area declined, 
respectively, by 2.08% and 1.69% per year. 
26  Should more rural labor move out of the 
agricultural sector and more machinery be used in farming, China’s agricultural 
productivity could expect a major improvement. 
27 However, considering the current 
industrial structure and land tenancy system, this would be a very difficult and slow 
process. Furthermore, based on 2000 data, China’s manufacturing labor productivity was 
only 92% of that in India and less than 5% of that in Brazil, France, Japan, and the United 
States (figure 2). 
 
Table 5.  Productivity Comparison in Agriculture, Industry, and Services (1999) 
(Related GDP per person employed in industry, US$) 
 China  U.S.  U.K.  Germa
ny 
Japan Finland Korea Malays
ia 
Brazil Chile  Thailan
d 
Agriculture  512  53657 62117 41332  25902 34835  10439 3733  3795  7059  885 
Industry  2954  81077 60168 64556  80860 65977  32138 13534  19827 18244 8506 
Services  1751  66494 48329 58205  64294 52199  16959 7365  13771 12349 5773 
Source: IMD, The World Competitiveness Yearbook 2000, Lausanne, Switzerland, pp461-463. 
 
           Table 6.  Cereal Yields (Selected Countries) 
                 (kilograms per hectare) 
Year China  United 
States 
France Japan  India  S  Korea  Malaysia Brazil 
1976–81  3,027 4,151 4,700  5,252  1,324 4,986 2,828  1,496 
1999–2001 4,869 5,824 7,088  6,147  2,321 6,500 3,075  2,825 









Table 7.  Rural Labor Density and Agricultural Machinery Comparison (1999/2000) 
                                                 
25 Knight, John and L. Song, “Chinese Peasant Choices: Migration, Rural Industry or Farming”, Oxford 
Development Studies, V31, No.2, June 2003. 
26 Yao, Shujie, “Agriculture’s Role in Economic Development: The Case of China”, from Cook, Sarah, 
Shujie Yao and J. Zhuang, ed., The Chinese Economy Under Transition, MacMillan (London) and St. 
Martin’s (New York), 2000. Also Yao, S., Economic Reforms and Grain Production in China, MacMillan, 
London, 1994. 
27 A household survey in Zouping County, Shandong Province, collected between 1990 and 1994, shows 
that, when controlling for household off-farm employment, the effect of per capita land on incomes 
increases by approximately 10%. This result may be due to the effect of moving labor out of agriculture. As 
labors move off the land, other resources may be more efficiently allocated and the returns to land also 
increase. Controlling for employment, a one mu (Chinese measure, equaling 1/15
th of a hectare) increase in 
per capita land leads to a 36% increase in per capita household income. See Cook, S., “Employment, 
Enterprise and Inequality”, from Cook, Sarah, Shujie Yao and J. Zhuang, ed., The Chinese Economy Under 
Transition, MacMillan (London) and St. Martin’s (New York), 2000.      12
  China  United 
States  France Japan India S  Korea Malaysia Brazil 
No. of rural labors 
per hectare of arable 
land (1999) ∗ 
4.11  0.02  0.05 0.62  1.63 1.39  0.97  0.25 
Agricultural 
machinery per 1,000 
agricultural workers 
(2000) 
0.00  1.56  1.35 0.73  0.01 0.07  0.02  0.06 
Source: World Bank SIMA database, 2003. 
             ∗ Author’s calculation based on the same database. 
 
Figure 2   Manufacturing Productivity versus GDP/Capita, for Period 1980–84 Compared 
to 1995–99 (Average Nominal US $) 
           Source: Author’s analysis based on data from the World Bank Development Indicators 2003.  
According to Hwa’s research, China’s labor productivity gains experienced a jump in the 
early 1990s, but then slowed down in all sectors of the economy (figure 3). 
28 Labor 
productivity is much lower in agriculture, services, and construction sectors than in 





Figure 3  China’s Labor Productivity , 1987-97 (Yuan per Person) 
                                                 
28 Hwa, E. C. 2000. “China: Service Sector Development and Competitiveness.” Mimeo. World Bank,  
Washington, D.C. 
















     Source: Hwa 2000 and World Bank staff calculations.  
 
Considering China’s severe employment situation, to keep the current labor-intensive 
industries viable would be crucial to prevent more people from being laid-off. However, 
the huge productivity gaps between China and international competitors and the 
enhanced competition after China’s accession to the World Trade Organization would 
make it very difficult. Although the liberalization process will be gradual with time for 
adjustment (box 1), the Chinese economy will unavoidably face strong international 
competitive pressures, forcing it to restructure and optimize itself according to its 
international comparative advantage.  
 
Box 1  Accession to the World Trade Organization Entails Important Changes
 
The commitment of China to the World Trade Organization on a set of trade reforms that will have far-reaching
impact on its economy: 
•  Eliminating the import quota by 2006. 
•  Eliminating import tariffs on computers, semiconductors, and related products by 2005. 
•  Reducing the import tariff on agricultural products from 22% to 17.5%. 
•  Reducing the import tariff on industrial products from 24. % to 9.4%. 
•  Reducing the import tariff on vehicles from 100% to 25% by 2006. 
•  Reducing the import tariff on vehicle parts by 10%. 
•  Allowing up to 50% foreign ownership of telecommunications and insurance. 
•  Allowing importers to own domestic distribution networks. 
•  Allowing full market access for foreign banks within five years of accession (foreign banks will be able to
conduct local currency business with Chinese enterprises two years after accession).   14
III. China’s Employment Strategies After WTO Accession 
 
Faced with the serious employment problems compounded by its entry into the WTO, 
China has to take effective steps to deal with the challenges. On one hand, China must 
fully expand the development of the private sector, especially the small and medium 
enterprises, promote the service industries, and reform the overly burdened SOEs; on the 
other hand, it must establish a nation-wide social safety net, improve the labor market, 
and provide mass on-the-job training or reemployment and re-skilling trainings.  
 
III.1 Encouraging the Private Sector 
 
China is now undertaking a dramatic transformation from a traditionally planned 
economy to a market-based economy. Although China’s economic growth has gained 
great success by first restructuring agriculture and then moving people out of agriculture 
and into industry, the traditional industrial enterprises such as state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs), township and village enterprises (TVEs) are losing steam. The number of 
workers in state-owned units 
29  plunged from 112 million in 1995 to 71.6 million in 
2002, and those in collective urban units from 32 million to 11.2 million, a decline of 
32% and 65%, respectively. Most of the losses are from the SOEs or collective-owned 
enterprises, though the exact figures are hard to obtain. Meanwhile, the number of 
employees in the private enterprises (including enterprises fully registered as private plus 
some sort of shareholding and joint ownership companies—rose from 13 million to 42 
million (more than tripled), and the those in foreign plus Hong Kong, Macao & Taiwan 
enterprises increased from 5.1 million to 6.7 million, or 31%. 
30  The employment 
elasticity of the self-employed and private enterprises in general is considerably higher 
that that of enterprises of other ownerships. 
31   
 
The emergence of the domestic private sector is the most important result of the reform 
process in China and the domestic private sector is increasingly important in contributing 
to output and the creation of new jobs. The output of the private sector has grown an 
average of 71 percent per year since 1980, and non-state employment has risen an 
average of 41 percent per year. According to an IFC study, privately owned enterprises 
currently account for 33 percent of the Chinese gross domestic product, compared to the 
state-sector's 37 percent. However, including privately owned agribusiness brings the 
total to 51 percent; and with the contribution of collective enterprises, which are in 
various intermediate forms of non-state ownership, the total non-state contribution to 
China’s GDP amounts to some 62 percent. 
32  As a result, the private sector has become 
the major source of reemployment or job creation. This point is demonstrated by the fact 
                                                 
29 According to the China Statistic Yearbook, the “units” not only include state-owned enterprises (SOEs), 
but also the state-owned social services (public facilities, community and recreation services, etc.), 
education, public health, R&D institutions, and government/party agencies, etc.  The same concept applies 
to the “collective units”.  
30 Based on data from China Statistical Yearbook, 1999, 2002, China Statistical Press, Beijing.  
31 Lu, Ming, et al., “Employment Restructuring during China’s Economic Transition”, Monthly Labor 
Review, Vol. 125, No. 8, August 2002.  
32 IFC: China’s Emerging Private Enterprises: Prospects for the New Century, 2000, Washington, DC, 
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that the unemployment rate is high in areas where the private economy is under-
developed, whereas it is low in those areas with a flourishing private economy. 
33   
 
Table 8.   Structure of Employment, by Type of Ownership in China 
(1980–2000, in Millions of Workers) 
Notes: 
a  The “units” not only include state-owned or collective-owned enterprises, but also the state or 
collective-owned social services (public facilities, community and recreation services, etc.), education, 
public health, R&D institutions, and government/party agencies, etc.  
 
b Under this heading are companies classified as private enterprises (normally informal), plus those 
classified as joint-owned units, limited shareholding corporations, limited liability corporations, and 
shareholding corporations. The last two categories actually appear only from 1998 on.  Note that in China, 
an important amount of employees are not registered in any official category (floating employment). 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2002, calculated from table 5-4. 
 
Empirical studies also show that the private sector has achieved significantly greater 
productivity gains and R&D efficiencies and has contributed more to economic growth 
than all other sectors. 
34  Wei, Zuobao, et al. studied the pre- and post-privatization 
financial and operating performance of 208 firms privatized during 1990-97. Results 
show significant improvements in real output, real assets, and sales efficiency, but no 
significant change in profitability. A further performance comparison between 41 fully 
state-owned firms and 41 privatized firms for the period of 1994-1999 shows that 
privatized firms experienced significant improvements in profitability, employment, and 
sales efficiency, especially those with over 50% voting control conveyed to private 












                                                 
33 Lee, Hong Yung, “Xiagang, The Chinese Style of Laying Off Workers”, Asian Survey, V40, No. 6, 
November/December 2000. 
34 Zhang, Anming, et al., “A Study of the R&D Efficiency and Productivity of Chinese Firms”, Journal of 
Comparative Economics, V31, 2003, pp. 444-464; and Lo, V. and X. Tian, “Property Rights, Productivity 
Gains and Economic Growth: the Chinese Experience”, Post-Communist Economies, V14, No. 2, 2002.  
35 Wei, Zuobao, et al., “The Financial and Operating Performance of China’s Newly Privatized Firms”, 
Financial Management, V32, No. 2, 2003.  





















1980  423.6 105.3  80.2 24.3  0.4  ..  0.8  318.4  30.0 ..  .. 
1985 498.7 128.1  89.9 33.2  0.5  .. 4.5 370.7  69.8 ..  .. 
1990 693.1 170.4  103.5  35.5  1.5 0.7 6.1  471.1  92.7 1.1  14.9 
1995 679.5 190.4  112.6  31.5  8.6 5.1 15.6  490.3  128.6 4.7  30.5 
2000 720.9 231.5  81.0 15.0  26.1  6.4  21.4  489.3  128.2 11.4  29.3   16
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Notes: The mean (median) values before and after year zero (1996, the year when the 41 firms were 
privatized) are calculated separately for each group. The before calculation uses a two-year average (1994-
95) and after a three-year average (1997-99). The Wilcoxon signed rank test (z-statistic) is the significance 
of the mean change. The ‘mean before’ and ‘mean after’ values for net profit level and sales efficiency are 
normalized using the year zero (1996 = 1.00) value.  
a Net income after taxes;  
b Total No. of employees; 
c  Sales/total employment; 
d  No. of usable observations.  
*** Significant at the 0.01 level.  
Source: Wei, Zuobao, et al. (2003).  
 
However, though very promising, due to various constraints and limitations, the full 
potential of the private sector is far from being released. Instead, the private firms have to 
remain under a veil of informality, and have a limited ability to evolve beyond the first, 
informal stages of life and tend to become “stuck” in a framework of legal, financial, 
governance, and market structures because of their informal status.  
 
















   Source: International Finance Corporation Beijing office, and Helmut Schonleber, “China’s Private 
Economy,” presentation for the DIHT-ACFIC Partnership Project, 2001.  
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In one sense, informality has been the private sector’s great strength during a period of 
uncertainty and rapid change. It has allowed private enterprises to respond 
flexibly to changing policies and regulations and to new market opportunities, while 
diversifying risk and avoiding excessive taxation, regulation, and competition. However, 
informality creates serious obstacles to the further growth and development of the sector, 
leaving large, mature companies stuck with structures more suited to small, young 
companies. It also makes companies opaque and unfocused, endows them with 
limited management capacity, and difficulty in attracting funding and skills they need to 
grow or survive. This is especially true for the self-employed businesses: since 1999, the 
number of  self-employed began to drop, and by 2001, this number (48 million) has 
almost shrunk to the 1995 level (46 million).
36  In order to survive in this somewhat 
uncertain political landscape of a transition economy and system, some private 
enterprises have to disguised themselves by ‘wearing a red hat’ (falsely declaring 
themselves as ‘collectively owned’).
37  This will inevitably hinder their operational 
efficiency. 
 
In 1997, the private sector was recognized in a constitutional amendment. The 
amendment provides a basis of a better policy environment for private firms. The next 
important step would be to officially recognize private property. Although the 1999 
Constitutional Amendment guaranteed protection to private property, such property was 
not placed on exactly the same footing as state property. Lack of security and fear of 
possible appropriation by the state are still disincentives for Chinese people to fully apply 
themselves, expand private businesses, and make long-term investments, thus hampering 
economic growth.   
 
In order to encourage continuing private sector growth, the government should create a 
level playing field for all enterprises by intervening less, strengthening the legal 
framework for protecting the private property rights, providing incentives to lend to 
private businesses, and focusing on improved commercial legislation and more open 
markets. Financial institutions must develop to serve the private sector, by providing 
greater access to bank loans and credits. Meanwhile, the private enterprises also need to 
mature and improve their corporate governance, in order to derive the most benefit from 
improvements in the business environment.
38 
 
III.2 Promoting Small and Medium Enterprises 
 
Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) tend to be the most dynamic part of a country’s 
economy. Due to their entrepreneurship and flexibility, SMEs can be very competitive if 
matched with a sound business environment, skillful people and good governance. In 
China, since most SMEs, especially those in the urban areas, are in the tertiary sector, 
they have become an increasingly important source of job creation and reemployment for 
laid-off workers. According to Rong, small enterprises have a greater capacity for 
absorbing labor or generating new employment than large enterprises. Compared on a per 
                                                 
36 China Statistical Yearbook, 1999, 2002, China Statistical Press, Beijing.  
37 Pannell, Clifton W., “China’s Continuing Urban Transition”, Environment and Planning, V34, No. 9, 
September 2002. 
38 IFC: China’s Emerging Private Enterprises: Prospects for the New Century, 2000, Washington, DC, 
USA.   18
unit of investment basis, the capacity for small enterprises to absorb labor could be as 
much as 14 times the capacity of large enterprises.
39  However, at current stage, a large 
number of SMEs, notably the TVEs, are facing many constraints and challenges in a 
more and more competitive environment. The majority of TVEs have limited 
technological and human resources to become internationally competitive,
40 and most 
SMEs in general have difficulties accessing financing, credits, technical assistance, 
market information, training and so on. In order to fully unleash the dynamism of SMEs 
for economic growth and employment generation, the government should undertake 
proactive strategies to help the development of SMEs in all sectors, from agriculture to 
services: 
41 
•  Drastically reducing the many regulatory hurdles for establishing and operating new 
private enterprises. 
•  Ensuring that small and medium-size enterprises have access to bank credit.  
•  Promoting informal lending schemes to small start-up businesses, such as group 
lending and special micro-venture schemes. 
•  Providing small and medium enterprises access to market and technical information. 
•  Setting up “small business incubator” to assist start-ups in finding appropriate 
technologies, skills, and venues/equipment, setting up managerial and accounting 
systems, and preparing relevant documents. 
42  
•  Developing formal and informal basic business and accounting skill training aimed at 
SMEs.  
•  Strengthening university and continuing education offerings relating to business and 
entrepreneurial skills. 
•  Drawing on extensive global experience on small and medium enterprise support 











Box 2  Government Support for SMEs 
 
Small and medium-size enterprises account for significant economic activity in all high-income countries. 
In the EU they make up 93% of firms, with nearly two-thirds of employment (more than 70 million 
                                                 
39 See Mo Rong (2001), “Some Effects of China’s Joining the WTO on Employment, and Certain Policy 
Proposals in Response to the Problem”, The Chinese Economy, V34, No. 5, pp. 5-6. The paper was 
translated by M.E. Sharpe, Inc., from original Chinese text.  
40 Yao, Shujie, “China’s Rural Economy in the First Decade of the 21
st Century: Problems and Growth 
Constraints”, China Economic Review, V13, 2002, pp. 354-360. 
41 This section draws on World Bank, China & Knowledge Economy: Seizing the 21
st Century, 2001, the 
World Bank, Washington, DC. 
42 Jun, Tang, “Joining the WTO, the Employment Problem, and How to Deal With It”, The Chinese 
Economy, V34, No. 3, May-June 2001.    19
people). In the United States, more than 50% of private employees are employed by SMEs, and they 
account for 78% of employment in nonprimary industry in Japan. This is especially true of the service 
sector, where SMEs are particularly prevalent. 
 
In order to promote these types of enterprises, governments of advanced countries enact policies and 
programs that promote entrepreneurial activity. Most OECD countries have specific agencies responsive 
for promoting small business. Agencies such as the Small Business Administration in the U.S., the Small 
and Medium Business Administration in South Korea, and the Small Business Service in the United 
Kingdom provide assistance and support for people trying to start a small business. However, there are 
often many regulatory hurdles that small business founders must contend with to gain access to the 
incentive programs and benefits provided by the government, which potentially discourages would-be 
entrepreneurs. Best practice in this area are “one-stop shops” for SME information and program benefits, 
such as One Stop Capital Shops in the U.S., and the UK’s Direct Access Government online resource.  
 
Lack of finance availability is a major impediment to small business growth. Governments often facilitate 
venture capital and other methods of financing in order to spur growth of small firms. In addition, many 
governments provide fiscal incentives, such as grants or tax breaks, to provide financial incentives for small 
enterprise growth. A particularly effective form of growth for SMEs is through exports. Therefore, many 
countries have also targeted SMEs with export credit programs and/or assisted them with accessing foreign 
markets. 
 
Innovation is also an important part of small business development. Best-practice governments provide 
grants for R&D to small enterprise, as well as providing technological support through diffusion programs 
designed to promote the flow of expertise throughout the economy. In addition, ICT technologies are 
providing significant opportunities for cost cutting and to widen their market penetration through B2B and 
B2C ecommerce, providing opportunities for SMEs to serve very small market niches that might otherwise 
be impractical and unprofitable. 
 
 
Table 10.  Best Practice in SME Promotion 
Regulatory reform  Funding and 
promotion 
Innovation and technology  Market access 
•  US – One Stop 
Capital Shops 
•  UK (regional), Direct 
Access Government 
•  Portugal – Centres for 
Company Formalities 
•  South Korea – Small 
and Medium Business 
Association 
•  Norway – Action Plan 
for Small Enterprises 








•  Netherlands – SME 
Credit Guarantee 
Scheme 




•  Denmark – 
VaekstFonden Loan 
Programme 
•  US – Small Business 
Innovation Research 
programme 
•  South Korea – Enterprise 
Information Incubator 
Project 
•  Canada – Industrial 
Research Assistance 
Program 
•  Sweden – Foundation for 
Technology Transfer 
•  Ireland – Small Business 
Operational Programme 
•  Spain – 100 Policy for 
SMEs 
•  Turkey – Export 
Credit Programme 
•  US –Export Express 
•  Mexico – Export 
Guidance System 
•  Australia – Export 
Access Program 
•  Netherlands – New 
Businesses in Foreign 
Markets 
Source: OECD SME Outlook 2000. Paris. 
 
 
III.3 Expanding the Service Sector 
 
As an important measure of increasing employment and enhancing international 
competitiveness, the Chinese government should especially encourage the development   20
of service industries. Due to past policy biases, the service sector in China is very under-
developed for a country of its GDP per capita level (figure 5). In 2001, China’s share of 
services in GDP (33.6) is even lower than that of Bangladesh (51.7), Kenya (62.9), 
Ethiopia (36.6), and Tanzania (39.4), not to mention the developed countries, and made 
almost no progress from the 1991 level of 33.4 percent. Although China has an 
impressive FDI (foreign direct investment) stock, most of it (66.6%) is concentrated in 
manufacturing and related industries, with only 31.6% in services in 2000. Furthermore, 
the bulk of this investment (23.6% of total FDI) goes to the real estate business, leaving 
only 8% in other service industries.
43  This unbalanced structure is mainly due to the 
policy constraints imposed on foreign participation in services.  
 
      Figure 5  Underdeveloped Service Sector in China 













                                Per capita GDP (Constant 1995 US$, log) 
                              * For some countries,  data are from 2000.
China
 
     Source: World Bank SIMA database.  
 
In the short and medium terms, the underdeveloped service sector will be the major 
source for economic development and job creation. It is generally believed among 
Chinese scholars that a 1% increase in GNP would create either 800,000 jobs in 
secondary industry or 1.3 million new jobs in the tertiary sector. 
44  The potential for 
growth is huge in such industries as financial and insurance services, business 
management, technical consulting, telecom, law, distribution, sales, marketing, 
advertising, public relations, accounting, computer programming, E-commerce, logistics, 
travel, and tourism. The rapidly developing urban informal service sector, such as 
restaurants, retailing, construction, repair, housing and delivery services, has become the 
major source of absorbing the rural-urban migrants. Within this sector, the self-employed 
                                                 
43 China FDI Net: http://www.chinafdi.org.cn/ 
44 Lee, Hong Yung, “Xiagang, The Chinese Style of Laying Off Workers”, Asian Survey, V40, No. 6, 
November/December 2000.    21
group has generally acted as a long-term employment opportunity for migrants. 
45  From 
1993-2001, while employment in the traditional urban formal sector has been shrinking 
(from 81.4% to 36.1%), the urban informal sector (where services account for the major 
part) has been adding workers rapidly (from 6.3% to 15.3%, though it had a slight decline 
in 2000 mainly due to a reduction in self-employed, see table 11). In addition, service  
industries in small towns would be an important resort for redundant rural labor, where 
public services, transportation, warehousing and trading of agricultural products, and 
information and technical services will have great room for expansion. Based on a 
 
Table 11. Changes in the Urban Employment Structure (1990-2001, millions) 
Traditional Formal Sector    Informal Sector    Year Total 
Urban 
Employed 
Total number of 
staff and workers 
% in total urban 
employed 
Total number of 
employment 
% in total urban 
employed 
1990 166.16  138.95  83.6  6.71  4.0 
1991 169.77  142.92  84.2  7.60  4.5 
1992 172.41  145.10  84.2  8.38  4.9 
1993 175.89  143.13  81.4  11.16  6.3 
1994 184.13  141.01  76.6  15.57  8.5 
1995 190.93  140.31  73.5  20.45  10.7 
1996 198.15  139.03  70.2  23.29  11.8 
1997 202.07  135.83  67.2  26.69  13.2 
1998 206.78  107.09  51.8  32.32  15.6 
1999 210.14  99.88  47.5  34.67  16.5 
2000 231.51  93.24  40.3  34.04  14.7 
2001 239.40  86.50  36.1  36.58  15.3 
Notes: 1. The “traditional formal sector” refers to the urban state-owned and collective units, and the “informal sector” 
refers to the domestic informal private and self-employed units (mostly enterprises). In the urban employment, except 
these two categories, there are also the “emerging formal sector”, which includes units (mostly enterprises) with joint, 
share-holding, or limited liability ownerships (which can be broadly defined as ‘formal private’. Refer to table 8), as 
well as foreign and Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan ownerships and their affiliates. Also, for the “traditional formal 
sector”, here we only include the “staff and workers”, which refer to the full-time employees but exclude the re-hired 
retirees.    
2. In the Chinese statistics, the “total urban employed” also includes the laid-off or Xiagang workers from state-owned 
and collectives. These workers have been laid off while still nominally holding an employment relationship (or 
contract) with their enterprises or units.  However, many of them do not receive any living expenses from their units or 
have any other source of income, and they should be categorized as “unemployed”.  This is one of the reasons that, in 
the Chinese statistic books, there is a discrepancy between the total employed and the total number of employees in all 
formal and informal sectors adding together.    
Source: China Labor Statistical Yearbook 2002, China Statistics Yearbook, various years, and Hu, Angang 
(2001).  
 
preliminary estimation, by 2005, about 33 percent of China's labor force will be working 
in the service sector, which is expected to recruit about another 30 million new 
employees in the coming years. 
46   
 
Service industries are knowledge and labor-intensive, and therefore are particularly 
necessary for the transition to a knowledge based society. Their businesses are also cross-
cutting all other sectors, thus, productivity gains made in service sector industries not 
only benefit the service industries themselves, but benefits also trickle down through 
                                                 
45 See Meng, Xin’s study (2001) based on a survey of 1504 rural-urban migrants in Jinan city, Shandong 
Province in 1995. “The Informal Sector and Rural-Urban Migration – A Chinese Case Study”, Asian 
Economic Journal, V15, No.1, 2001. 
46 “Call for More Jobs in China's Service Sector”,  Asia Times, April 27, 2002: http://www.atimes.com.   22
other sectors, including manufacturing and agriculture, leading to huge productivity and 
efficiency gains in all segments of the economy.  
 
Currently most of the service industries in China are still dominated by state monopolies 
or oligopolies, such as banking, distribution, transportation, telecommunications, media, 
utilities, logistics, health care, and even tourism. In order to fully unleash the potential of 
the service sector, the government needs to deregulate the sector, introduce more 
competition, and gradually open it to foreign investors, and particularly encourage the 
private sector to participate in the service industries.        
 
III.4 Reforming the State-owned Enterprises 
 
China's network of nearly 200,000 state-controlled companies once formed the backbone 
of the nation's economy, but now hangs like an albatross around Beijing's neck. The 
SOEs' contribution to China's gross domestic product fell from nearly 100% in the early 
1980s to about 30% in 2000 as the more efficient private and semi-private sector 
outpaced the state sector. However, still employing over 53 million people 
47 and 
accounting for about 60% of government revenues in 2001, SOEs continue to play an 
important role in the Chinese economy, and their restructuring or transformation can be 
cited as the most challenging industrial policy problem faced by any government in the 
world. In order to maintain them, the government propped up the loss-making firms with 
loans from state-controlled banks and saddled itself with hundreds of billions of dollars 
of non-performing loans. 
 
In the past five years, the government also adopted the strategy of selling or privatizing 
smaller state-owned enterprises and laying off workers to improve efficiency and 
productivity. These policies were marginally successful but contributed to a sharp rise of 
unemployment. In May 2003, the government launched a new plan by creating the 
central State Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). The new 
commission’s priorities are to ensure better management and curtail the loss of assets by 
separating the ownership and management aspects of the state-owned firms. The 
commission's goal is to eventually reconstruct 30 to 50 state enterprises and build them 
into internationally competitive firms. Meanwhile, the government allows foreign firms 




Although the role of government in SOEs’ management and operation has been reduced 
under the Modern Enterprise System and Group Company System reforms 
49 since 1993, 
central ministries and local governments still retain influence or authority, especially on 
major management and personnel decisions. Downsizing SOE management has proved to 
be very difficult, since the party itself still has ultimate power over SOE managers’ 
appointments above a certain level, as well as great influence over many managers who 
                                                 
47 National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical Abstract 2003, China Statistics Press, 2003, p51.  
This figure only refers to those employed in the state-owned and state-controlled enterprises.  
48 China Development Gateway: http://www.chinagate.com.cn. 
49 Which were intended to restructure enterprises based on the principle of corporatization, and separate 
state’s exercise of ownership rights from the enterprise’s exercise of legal person property rights.    23
are party members. 
50  International experiences show that the state does not necessarily 
have to get out of the production entirely, but that it should get out of sectors that are not 
strategic, or those in which it does not have a comparative advantage.  
 
To make the SOEs more efficient and productive, the government should take the 
following measures:  
•  Expediting the reform of SOE corporate governance structures to curtail 
government interference and reduce the dominance of insiders. As long as the 
party or government appoints the top managers, the SOEs will only respond to 
their bosses within the party or government instead of reacting to the needs of the 
market. SOEs should be given more autonomy with elected managers and 
independent boards of directors, which should be the highest level of decision 
making, while government representatives, whatever their level, should be 
separated from business decisions. For those privatized former SOEs, government 
should fully withdraw its direct interference and allow them to operate in a 
market-based mechanism.   
•  Adopting a narrow definition of the SOE core to include only those industries 
such as defense, aerospace, aviation, electricity, gas and so on, where continued 
government involvement is essential on economic grounds.   
•  Unbundling social service functions. SOEs are burdened by obligations to provide 
housing, pension, medical treatment, basic education and other social services. 
The unbundling will require the rapid establishment of a social security system 
and other safety nets. 
•  Resolving the asset ownership. The state assets should be well protected by law 
and not be freely used, sold, or transformed by enterprise management. The 
establishment of SASAC seems a great step towards this direction. 
•  Accelerating the financial reforms, in particular the development of bond markets; 
and of smaller banks and other financial institutions as alternatives to the four 
large state commercial banks, and improving the monitoring and supervision of 
bank loans. Meanwhile, the creditors’ role in corporate control should be 
strengthened. Allowing greater room for commercial bank involvement in 
investment banking activities, such as providing securities advice and custodial 
services that can lead to proxy voting by banks, will enhance banks’ role in 
corporate governance. 
51 
•  Facilitating the spin-off or creation of small private enterprises from bankrupt and 
other state enterprises through policy incentives. Some good examples can be 
identified in Shanghai and Beijing, where the municipal governments help surplus 
workers from SOEs set up new small businesses on their own by easing 
registration procedures and offering tax holidays. 
52 
 
                                                 
50 Sheehan, Jackie, J. Morris and J. Hassard, “Redundancies in Chinese State Enterprises: A Research 
Report”, Industrial Relations, V39, No. 3, July 2000.  
51 Tenev, Stoyan and C. Zhang, “Corporate Governance and Enterprise Reform in China”, the World Bank 
and the International Finance Corporation, Washington, D.C., 2002 
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III.5 Strengthening the Social Security System 
 
Considering the current and foreseeable future large unemployment and joblessness in 
China, to strengthen or establish a nation-wide social security system and appropriate 
social safety nets, or so called “social infrastructure”, 
53  is essential for its long-term 
development and stability. Such a system would relieve SOEs from excess financial 
burdens and make them more productive, facilitate labor mobility, and help prevent 
unemployed population from slipping into poverty.  
 
Since 1998, the Chinese government has adopted a "two guarantees" system. The first is 
a guarantee of the basic living of the laid-off workers from SOEs. The second guarantee 
is to ensure basic living for all retirees and that they receive basic pensions in full and on 
time. To ensure the implementation of the "two guarantees," the Chinese government 
implemented three corresponding policies: laid-offs from SOEs can receive a basic living 
allowance from the reemployment service centers 
54 for a maximum of three years; if they 
still haven't found a job by then, they can receive unemployment insurance 
55 payments 
for a maximum of two years; and at the end of the two-year period, if they still haven't 
been reemployed, they can apply for the urban minimum living allowance. These  
are the so-called “three social security lines” in China. By 2001, the majority of people 
laid off by SOEs were receiving a basic living allowance, and retired personnel were 
receiving their pensions in full and on time. Meanwhile, the government has tried to 
consolidate these different systems. Starting from January 2001, no more new re-
employment centers would be established for SOEs in principle, and the new laid-offs 
would directly enjoy unemployment insurance, which is also being gradually integrated 
with the minimum living guarantee system. 
56  
 
The major problems of the current social security system are the limited funding 
(insurance funding per unemployed worker is about 210 yuan in early 2003), small 
coverage (less than 10% of the total population with the rural areas barely covered), lack 
of detailed macro policy analyses and coordination among relevant ministries, as well as 
deficiencies in implementation. Arrears of payments are often serious, since enterprises 
in difficulty cannot furnish their share for the basic living allowance or unemployment 
insurance, while many government civil affairs agencies are not properly funding or 
implementing the minimum living allowance policy.
57  In some cases, even people still 
                                                 
53 Huang, Fan-Zhang, “The Current Economic Situation and Trends in China with a Discussion on 
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the New Millennium, Volume 9-A, Amsterdam; New York and London: Elsevier Science, JAI, 2001.  
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working may not get paid, and in other cases, it is difficult to identify those with other 
source of income or new employment: some laid-off workers with income continue to 
receive compensation, while many without an income source do not receive payments.
58  
 
All these issues have to be addressed through a concerted, well coordinated effort across 
the government agencies (such as ministries of labor, personnel, finance, civil affairs, and 
State Development and Reform Commission), public/private sectors, and urban/rural 
areas. An urgent need is to increase the funding for the minimum living guarantee 
system. Although the fiscal budget for minimum living guarantee system reached nearly 
11.5 billion yuan in 2002, it only accounted for tiny 0.1% of its total GDP or less than 
0.5% of the total government fiscal expenditure (table 12). This is very low compared 
with developed countries. Figures of developed countries in mid 1990s show that, on 
average,  they spent about 1-2% of GDP for their social relief system, about 10 times that 
of China. Considering the huge needs and massive unemployment in China, the 
governments at all levels have to substantially increase their funding for the social 
security system. 
 
Table 12.  Scale and Magnitude of the Urban Minimum Living Guarantee Fund (1996-
2002) 










Share of total 
fiscal 
expenditure (%) 
1996  0.85  3.0 0.0 3.0  0.004 0.04 
1997  0.88  11.5 0.0 11.5  0.004  0.03 
1998  1.84  12.0 0.0 12.0  0.015  0.11 
1999  2.81  19.7 4.0 15.7  0.024  0.15 
2000  3.82  29.6 8.0 21.6  0.034  0.19 
2001  11.32  54.2 23.0 31.2  0.055  0.28 
2002 19.30  114.7  46.0  68.7  0.112  0.52 
Source: China National Bureau of Statistics, China Statistic Yearbook, 2002, 2003. Hong Dayong (2003), 
“Latest Development of Urban Minimum Living Guarantee System”, China Social Development Research 
Report 2002, Publishing House of People’s University, p124.  
 
Meanwhile, while the fund size is increased, the scope of the minimum living guarantee 
fund should gradually be expanded to cover the long-term rural migrant workers in the 
urban areas, who have become part of urban dwellers, and also the most vulnerable group 
in the cities. Once they are unemployed, their risk of falling into poverty is higher than 
the local urban dwellers. Table 13 shows the current composition of the minimum 
guarantee recipients, with no rural migrants covered at all.  
 
Table 13.  Composition of the Urban Minimum Living Guarantee Recipients (2001-2002) 
  June 2001  June 2002 
Category  Number (10,000)  Share (%)  Number (10,000)  Share (%) 
On-post workers  
a 58  12.66  191  9.89 
Xiagang workers   
b 110  24.02  255  13.21 
Off-post workers  
c 0  0.00  442  22.89 
Retired workers  26  5.68  93  4.82 
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Unemployed workers  
d 76  16.59  299.3  15.50 
Dependents & others  135  29.48  554  28.69 
Socially Disadvantaged People  53  11.57  96.5  5.00 
Total 458  100.00  1930.8  100.00 
Notes: 
a  Those who have jobs but whose salaries are below the urban minimum living guarantee line. 
 b  The laid-off workers from state-owned or collective units, who still have nominal employment 
relationships with their units and normally receive certain small amounts of allowances. 
c  There are different situations in this category: some have terminated their employment relationships with 
their original units either voluntarily or involuntarily, and some still have relationships but not in duty due 
to unpaid leave (sometimes involuntarily), illness, etc., but they are not officially registered as unemployed. 
d  Those officially registered as unemployed at labor administration.  
Source: Hong Dayong (2003), “Latest Development of Urban Minimum Living Guarantee System”, China 
Social Development Research Report 2002, Publishing House of People’s University. 
 
On the other hand, it is a very challenging issue how to include the increasing number of 
rural migrants into the guarantee system. One possible way is to first include those who 
have lived and worked long enough in urban areas (for example, minimum one year). 
Another possibility is to consider establishing a nationwide minimum living guarantee 
system, and connecting the rural minimum guarantee system with the urban one.  
Furthermore, the enforcement of unemployment policies has to be strengthened by 
various levels of governments, employers, and other related parties.  
 
Also, in order to better utilize the limited resources, the unemployment-related relief 
system should not be only a welfare system that just hands out money, but an incentive-
based unemployment system, which is linked to achievements such as re-education, 
retraining or re-skilling.   
 
In addition to the basic living guarantee and unemployment insurance systems, other 
social safety nets need to be established as well, such as low-income housing, health 
systems, pension and disability funds, and other transferable benefit packages.  
 
III.6 Improving the Labor Market Flexibility 
 
The Chinese Government has acknowledged the importance of a well functioning labor 
market to support economic restructuring and address the problem of deepening 
inequalities in China, and has taken important steps to improve the labor market, 
however, it is far from being complete and faces many challenges. Among the existing 
labor market pressures, the 150 million surplus rural farm labors and 15 million 
unemployed urban labors unevenly distributed across China are the most severe ones. In 
addition, the large “floating population” without residency permits in urban areas may 
range from 90 to 150 million people, or 13% to 21% of the labor force. Without proper 
“hukou” (household registration), these people are forced to find low-paid unsavory 
employment in the black market. Labor mobility, especially rural-urban migration, seems 
crucial for alleviating these pressures and the associated social stress and inequalities, 
59 
especially when farmers have become increasingly reliant on off-farm employment and 
                                                 
59 Dahlman, C. and J. Aubert, China & Knowledge Economy: Seizing the 21
st Century, 2001, the World 
Bank, Washington, DC.   27
income opportunities for raising income.
60  According to a study by Knight and Song, 
non-farm activities in China are more rewarding than farm activities, both on average and 
at the margin.
61 Dealing with all these challenges and a huge labor force with a size of 
that in China requires a much more flexible labor market.   
 
Currently, the labor market in China is highly fragmented because of tough restrictions 
on migration, as well as other constraints on mobility such as geographically segmented 
and outmoded systems for social insurance and public services provision.
62  The labor 
market segmentation exists not only between urban-rural, but also within the urban and 
rural labor markets, and between the migrant and non-migrant. The biggest constraint on 
labor mobility is the household registration or hukou system. Under such a system, legal 
residence in a village, town or city is initially defined at birth and determines entitlements 
to local jobs, housing, schooling, healthcare and social security, and, in rural areas, to 
farming land as well. Unapproved migration can be extremely costly in terms of lost 
entitlements, and even approved movement can involve substantial losses, for example 
loss of claims on agricultural land without compensation.
63  This makes it very difficult to 
migrate between the rural and urban, between rural areas, between cities and between 
provinces (particularly workers with low qualifications), thus exacerbating the 
unemployment problem. Furthermore, the restrictions on labor mobility widen the 
income disparity between the coastal areas and the rest of China, and inflate the numbers 
entering illegal professions, such as prostitution, drug dealing, and smuggling. Instead, 
allowing labor moving out of agriculture and informal labor moving into formal 
activities, could result in substantially higher average marginal productivity, which is the 
source of the additional welfare gain. 
64 
 
Another important barrier to off-farm labor mobility is the absence of well-defined 
property rights for agricultural land. This leads to the retention of additional labor in the 
farm sector, because farm households have to consider the returns to land in their 
decision to work on- or off-arm, since leaving the farm means losing the land.  
 
In addition, there is more room for flexibility in employment policies. The introduction of 
contract employment in industry from 1986, which was intended to apply to all new 
entrants to the workforce, has contributed to firms’ greater flexibility and efficiency, 
however, it’s scope is still limited. In the state sector, poorly performing managers are 
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still generally only moved sideways (within or between enterprises) instead of being 
really bound by contract terms.
65  An empirical study of thirty food enterprises in China’s 
Guangdong Province also found that flexibility in the use of temporary or contract 
workers (those who do not have job tenure in their enterprises) could produce a positive 




In order to address all these issues, carefully gauged but effective measures need to be 
taken to enhance the labor flexibility, including further relaxing the hukou system. At 
initial stage, the hukou system can be partially dismantled, i.e., keeping some of its 
benefits attached to geography (such as education or retraining), but allowing others, 
including the ability to be employed and health care, to move with the population. Better 
labor mobility across enterprises, sectors and geographical areas, would facilitate further 
restructuring and mitigate its economic and social cost, including frictional and structural 
unemployment, underemployment, and income inequality. For the vast rural surplus 
labors and “floating population”, migration, under a flexible and healthy labor market 
framework, provides a mechanism for ensuring them not to be adversely affected by the 
trade reforms after the WTO entry, but actually sharing its benefits. The reform of the 
hukou system and land use rights, more flexible employment policies, establishing of 
social safety net and development of affordable housing market, would effectively 
facilitate the labor mobility and enterprise efficiency.  
 
Modeling results by Zhai, et al. (using the computable general equilibrium model), show 
that the net benefit from WTO membership will be maximized if China adopts a policy 
gradually to relax its rural-urban migration control in conjunction with a labor market 
reform, including the relaxation of the hukou system and land reform. Doing so not only 
prevents a dramatic worsening of the urban unemployment problem, but also permits 
enough labor market flexibility to create more employment opportunities for rural 
unskilled migrant labors. Furthermore, the combined impact of WTO accession and labor 
market reforms reduces rural-urban income inequality quite significantly (the urban/rural 
income gap would reduce by 46.5%, and the national Gini coefficient would fall about 
3.5% by 2007). 
67 Ianchovichina and Martin also estimated that the removal of the hukou 
system would raise farm wages and allow 28 million people to migrate to non-farm jobs 
in search of a better life. A combination of removal of the hukou system and an increase 
in skill levels is the most favorable scenario for unskilled farm labor leading to the largest 
increase in real farm wages (19.4% from 2001 to 2007). 
68  
 
In addition, the various existing employment service centers should be strengthened so 
that they can provide job search assistance, retraining, and certain guidance and 
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forecasting of future employment needs. The internet can be used to establish on-line job 
databases where people can post resumes and apply for jobs and the headhunters can 
identify appropriate candidates without geographical limitations.   
 
Beyond these actions, the government also needs a labor-using development policy, 
which could include: investing in public infrastructure, such as feeder roads, water 
supplies, and other basic social infrastructure, especially in the Western provinces; and 
developing small cities and towns creating construction that will absorb access labor. 
However, it is also important to consider the feasibilities and the sources of livelihood for 
those cities and towns before they were built.  
 
III.7 Establishing Mass Retraining Programs 
 
China’s drastic economic restructuring and SOEs reforms make it extremely important to 
carry out large nationwide labor retraining programs for the massive number of displaced 
and laid-off workers. From 1998 to 2000, 21.37 million people had been laid off from 
China’s SOEs, amounting to over 37 percent of the total work force of 57 million in this 
sector in 2000. 
69  Most of the “Xia-gang” (laid-offs) took place in China’s old industrial 
centers and underdeveloped regions such as northeast provinces and middle west 
provinces, and concentrated in mining, textile, machinery equipment and military 
equipment manufacturing sectors.  The majority of the laid-off workers have a very 
limited education background (table 14).  
 
Table 14.  Urban Unemployment in China by Education Background (2001, unit: 10,000 
persons) 
 
Total  College and above  Upper secondary  Lower secondary and 
below 
681.0 41.5  247.9  391.6 
100% 6.1%  36.4%  57.5% 
 Source: China Labor Statistical Yearbook 2002,  China Statistics Press, 2002,  
              and author’s calculation.   
 
In response to the massive unemployment problem, Chinese government has launched 
several retraining programs to help laid-off workers re-skill themselves and enhance their 
re-employability. A pilot “Reemployment Project” was initiated by Ministry of Labor and 
Social Security (MOLSS) in 30 municipalities in 1994 and then expanded to 200 cities in 
1995-96. Following the success of this pilot project, the MOLSS again in 1998 launch 
another reemployment project “Ten Million in Three Years” which means to provide 
reemployment training and job counseling services for 10 million laid-off workers in the 
duration of three years. In 2001, a second round of “Ten Million in Three Years” 
program was launched by MOLSS for the period of 2001-03. In addition, the government 
also launched other programs, such as “Warmth Project”, organized by the National 
Association of Vocational Education of China (NAVEC). 
 
  Table 15. Training Results from 10 Sample Provinces (1998) 
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Province Laid-off  workers 
(10,000 persons) 
People trained (10,000 
persons) 
Reemployment rate (%) 
Heilongjiang  62 46 65% 
Liaoning 35  19.7  40% 
Chongqing 11  4  71% 
Guangdong  45 24 70% 
Hubei  32 11 58% 
Hunan 44.8  8  72% 
Fujian 3  1.3  46% 
Henan  23.7 13.4 46% 
Ningxia  3.5 2.6 30% 
Xinjiang 4  1.5  27% 
  Source: China Employment Training Center, 1998. 
 
The results of these training programs were variant from province to province (table 15), 
for example, in Hunan, 72% of people were reemployed after training while in Xinjiang, 
only 27% were reemployed after training. An evaluation study by the research group at 
the World Bank on the retraining programs in Shenyang and Wuhan also showed mixed 
results. 
70 In general, retraining programs had a positive impact on the reemployment 
prospects of trainees in Wuhan, while in Shenyang they seemed to be ineffective. In both 
cities, training didn’t put any impact on trainees’ earnings. Training results were also 
different for workers of different gender, age and education backgrounds. The study also 
showed that the design of training programs had an impact: the longer-duration programs 
usually yielded better results. Meanwhile, more positive results can be seen from those 
programs where trainees had to pay at least part of the training costs. In addition, a survey 
conducted among the unemployed in August 2001 by the Ministry of Labor and Social 
Security in 10 large cities showed that 70 percent of the people surveyed had participated 




In order to maximize the effects, retraining programs need to be tailored to the job 
opportunities and to the ages and backgrounds of the workers to be retrained. One good 
example can be drawn from Shanghai’s case. The economic restructuring and SOE 
reform led to the shedding of about 500,000 textile workers in Shanghai since the end of 
1980s. Most of the workers made redundant were women in their 40s and 50s with little 
education and few marketable skills. The Textile Re-employment Service Center, 
sponsored by the municipal government, set up several dozen training bases focusing on 
computer techniques, accounting, cooking, sewing and other skills.  After massive 
retraining, an estimated 70% of the redundant workers were reemployed, while the 
remaining 30% chose early retirement or self-employment. Only one year after the 
Textile Re-employment Center was opened, Shanghai’s textile sector had restructured 
164 loss-making enterprises by either shutting them down, suspending production or 
shifting to manufacturing other goods. 
72  This experience definitely has applications to 
the rest of China.  
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In addition to tackling the current urgent reemployment training needs mostly from 
SOEs, China should also find ways to train the increasing number of rural emigrants 
(most of whom only have lower secondary education level, table 16), and to deal with the 
huge future demand for continuous education or on-the-job training as projected in table 
17. The government should also provide training and various support services for SMEs 
and new business start-ups. The training could focus on basic or core business skills, such 
as accounting, financing, marketing, business plan development, business registration, 
and taxation. 
 
Table 16. The Educational Levels of the Rural Emigrants (%, 1997-2000) 
  1997  1998 1999 2000 
Illiterate or half-illiterate  1.9  1.6  1.5  1.2 
Primary  21.3  19.9 18.6 18.1 
Junior  Secondary  58.5  58.7 59.7 61.2 
Senior  Secondary  13.8  14.3 14.2 13.4 
Secondary Professional Schools  3.5  4.3  4.6  4.7 
College or above  1.0  1.3  1.3  1.4 
Source: MOE: China Education & Human Resource Report – Stride from a Country of Tremendous 
Population to a Country of Profound Human Resources, Part Four, Higher Education Press, Beijing, 2003. 
 
Table 17.  Projection for the Continuous Education or On-the-job Training Needs for the 
Next 50 Years (100 million): 
  Senior high school and 
below 
College and above  Total 
2001-2010  2.0 0.4 2.4 
2011-2020  2.0 0.5 2.5 
2021-2030  1.8 0.9 2.7 
2031-2040  1.7 1.1 2.8 
2041-2050  1.6 1.5 3.1 
Source: MOE: China Education & Human Resource Report – Stride from a Country of Tremendous 
Population to a Country of Profound Human Resources, Part Four, Higher Education Press, Beijing, 2003.  
 
To fulfill such a daunting task, China needs an overall national strategy and policy 
framework for training and retraining, which should consist of: 1) to strengthen the 
cooperation and coordination among education, labor, and industry in the provision and 
financing of training; 2) to overcome the mismatch between skills supply and demand; 3) 
to provide policies for deregulating private provision and undertaking quality assurance; 
and 4) to fully unleash the great potential of distance learning, which is very promising 




China stands at a critical point in its overall development, faced with both opportunities 
and challenges, with severe unemployment being the immediate hurdle. A well-defined 
strategy would be crucial for China to overcome the challenges and truly become a global 
player in the 21
st century. 
   32
All the strategic thrusts recommended above are highly interrelated and should be 
considered and implemented in a systemic way, in order to effectively deal with the 
unprecedented employment challenge in the world’s most populous country. Meanwhile, 
government agencies at all levels, SOEs, private sector, business associations, banks, 
employment service centers, various reemployment and retraining institutions, labor 
unions, and all other relevant organizations should be brought together in a concerted and 
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